Transcript 0:00 [singing] Oh, baby. Welcome to another Lunch with Jamie. 0:06 Safe to say the world's in a strange place right now, with Donald Trump admitting that part of his reasoning for wanting to take over Greenland is because he didn't win the Nobel Peace Prize, to the recent capture of Venezuelan President Maduro, to Trump's threats to strike Iran. 0:20 Things are complex and uncertain, which is why I couldn't be happier to introduce today's guest, Richard Haass. To say Richard is an experienced diplomat is an understatement. 0:29 He worked for Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush One, Bush Two. He served as the President of the Council on Foreign Relations for almost 20 years. 0:38 He's written 13 books, most recently in 2023, The Bill of Obligations: The Ten Habits of Good Citizens, which I think is a must read for all people. 0:47 Richard also writes a Substack called Home and Away, which you subscribe to, and he co-hosts a podcast called Alternate Shots with Jon Ellis. And he also is the go-to for all news outlets as an expert on foreign affairs. 1:00 You know, in the conversation, we talked about the biggest shocks of the administration, tariffs, the publication of the National Security Strategy. 1:07 Uh, we went from the Russia-U- Ukraine War, looked at Israel and Gaza, uh, and obviously talked a lot about Iran. 1:16 He talked about why he views there's a zero chance of restoration to the pre-Trump world, uh, regardless of who we elect next, uh, and how much damage has been done to the future. 1:26 Uh, we also talked about why Iran isn't ready for regime change yet, and that's one of the biggest challenges, and why there's so many other ways it could have gone about what recently has been going on there that unfortunately are not the choices that were made. 1:40 Um, you know, we talked about the Board of Peace. Uh, s- you know, Richard is definitely scared about the f- elections in 2026 and beyond. 1:50 Uh, a lot of what's been happening with ICE, uh, and a lot of the Trump administration is definitely making a lot more people nervous, uh, and setting us up for potentially a whole host of things that could go wrong with those elections. 2:02 Uh, we also did talk about things that made him hopeful, which I appreciated. Um, 2:09 you know, what, what Jerome Powell's response was to Trump's comments, what Mark Kelly's been doing, Jack Smith, uh, some of the advancement in technology, the ability to combat climate change and help medicine. 2:20 Uh, and most importantly, he probably talked about, uh, how Fernando Mendoza from Indiana gave him hope after the extraordinary performance that they ha- he had in their win over Miami. 2:31 Uh, so the conversation wasn't heavy at all times. 2:34 Uh, I am also concerned a little bit about Richard's delusions to his, uh, how he thinks that, uh, Harbaugh is being the savior for the Giants, but we'll wait and see what happens there. 2:45 Uh, so anyway, hope you enjoy this conversation. Hope you get something out of it. Now, here's my interview with Richard Haass. [upbeat music] Hello, everybody. Uh, great to see you all. Um, 3:03 welcome to another Lunch with Jamie. Uh, please turn your camera on if you're able to. Uh, it, it's safe to say that, uh, the world's in a strange place right now. 3:13 Between, uh, Trump's obsession with taking over Greenland, to the recent capture of, uh, President Maduro, to Trump's threats to strike Iran, things are complex and uncertain, which is why I couldn't be happier to introduce our guest today, Richard Haass. 3:28 Richard, welcome. Thank you for joining us. Thank you, sir. To say Richard is an experienced diplomat is an understatement. He worked for Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush One and Two. 3:37 He then served as the President on Council of Foreign Relations for almost 20 years. He's written 13 books, most recently in 2023, the must-read, The Bill of Obligations: The Ten Habits of Good Citizens. 3:49 He's got a Substack called Home and Away, which you should all subscribe to. He co- hosts a podcast called Alternate Shots with Jon Ellis, and is the go-to for all news outlets as the expert on foreign affairs. 4:01 So to say we're lucky to have him is an understatement. Uh, Richard, I'm gonna start with the most, the most challenging question I always start with all my guests, which is, if I'm coming to New York City, 4:12 where are you taking me to eat? Tell me a little bit more about your food preferences. Oh, I, I like-- I don't like super high-end. I like, you know... 4:19 So I'd rather, I'd rather go to like, um, you know, uh, uh, just a local restaurant or just kind of a cool spot than hit up Per Se or Le Bernardin. 4:30 But if you're treating, I'm, I'm h- happy for you to take me there too, though. Zero chance of that. [laughs] Okay. [laughs] Dream on. 4:38 You get your old man to take you to Bern- Anthony Scaramucci said Rao's, which again, which is hard, hard to pass up Rao's. Yeah, but Rao- yeah, but Rao's, I don't have, uh, access to, uh- Right. Yeah... to, uh, Rao's. 4:51 Uh, so now I gotta think. Uh- I like, I love... Peter Luger's is probably my favorite restaurant in New York, maybe. Peter Luger's. Yeah. There's a couple of good steakhouses. Yeah. Uh, I like... 5:01 Yeah, there's a couple of good Italian restaurants. I like, I like Il Gattopardo and all that. Kinda like, I, I'm with you, I don't really like fancy stuff. I like good restaurants and a bit of kind of value. 5:12 I go to Avra some days for lunch just because it's in the, the hood. I mainly turn to my kids. They're my restaurant guides. 5:21 I got, like everyone else, my, my kids are in their, in this, they're in their 30s and they live in Brooklyn. 5:27 Well, well, well, well, um, any of those places sound great, and, uh, I, uh- You should get them to choose the restaurant. Okay, great. Like, they'll do much better. Perfect. Um, all right. 5:36 That was the toughest question of the whole day, I guarantee. I blew it. Also, I blew it, so go ahead. 5:39 [laughs] So unintentionally, we are having this conversation on the one-year anniversary of, uh, Trump's second inauguration. 5:47 Uh, he just finished his two-hour-plus press conference, which I can't even begin to comprehend what, what he talked about. 5:55 And, um, uh, w- if you had to pick three of the most consequential moments of this administration so far, or the things that were, um, the biggest kinda shockers, are, are you able to do that? 6:08 A couple of things.Uh, one is the, the tariffs, the, the unilateralism to upend the global trading system, to not treat friends differently or better than foes. 6:24 So I think tariffs were a, a massive as much political and psychological shock as they were a, um, an economic, uh, shock. Maybe the publication of the national security strategy about what now? 6:40 Six weeks, two months ago. Just because it codified essentially what we knew, but when you actually put it down in one place, it was a bit of, uh, one of those moments where you go, "Okay, this is for real." 6:57 You know, the emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, uh, then, you know, reinforced by what happened in, uh, in, in Venezuela. Uh, the unilateralism. 7:06 It's an anti-European almost diatribe, which began early on in, uh, Munich with Vance, but then again was captured in that, uh, in that, uh, document. 7:20 The last thing I would say was not such a moment so much as moments, Jamie, which was the, uh... 7:27 When you think about what was probably the biggest foreign policy issue of the first year, it's not Venezuela, it's not Iran, may or may not yet be Greenland, uh, but it was Ukraine 7:40 and Russia, and I think that raised fundamental questions about this admin- so again, it wasn't an event, but it took place over chunks of time. Still takes place. 7:49 It's still unfolding, and in some ways Greenland plays into it 'cause it reinforces the sense that Europe, rather than being the place, the, the venue where our best friends happen to be, 8:01 rather than being a strategic priority, has become a place from which we are distancing ourselves, and we don't see it as populated by friends. So again, it's not a single day. 8:11 It's not like the bombing of Iran or the snatch of Maduro, but I actually think in terms of con- what's the most consequential, uh, it's quite possible that the, the distancing from Europe is, is might be the single most... 8:27 The movement towards the Western Hemisphere and away from Europe, the combination of the two might be, uh, the most basic. Yeah, I mean, that gets into... 8:35 and I think talking about this, uh, national security document, which I think doesn't get enough, uh, play because y- as you're right, it kind of spelled out what they're doing and people just... 8:44 I mean, it's hard to keep up, unfortunately. Uh, but you know, it does seem like we've changed inherently for the foreseeable future, you know, w- what America's role is. 8:55 And I guess one of the questions, uh, which I hate to even ask, is how hard will it be to kinda turn the ship around, you know, uh, in, in 2028, uh, by the way, no matter who's elected to some extent. 9:10 I mean, I'm hoping, obviously there's a lot of candidates I'm excited about, but, um, y- you c- we're, we're not a small little, uh, you know, boat here, like, right? 9:19 I mean, to, to turn what, what's been done as far as a national policy, I mean, we no longer are the reliable country we have been for decades, you know? Right? I mean, 9:30 how do you- So I'd say a couple, I'd say a couple things. One is there's no consensus among the would-be successors. There's a big difference between Vance, 9:40 who could possibly double down on a lot of this, the Western Hemisphere, the anti-European bias, the unilateralism. Other Republicans might feel differently. I don't assume... 9:52 I don't know what a, a Marco Rubio would do if he were out from under, or a Glenn Youngkin. Nikki Haley's something of a neocon. So I think there's a big difference if a Republican were to win, which Republican. 10:06 Then on the Democrat side, most of the strong candidates, at least that I would ima- I think would be more in what you might call the old foreign policy mainstream, might be degrees of difference, but I don't think we would see, you know, massively radical, 10:22 i- if you will, the progressive equivalent of what we've seen. I, I don't foresee that. Uh, but all that said, you can't go back to where you were. In one or two areas you might not want to. 10:33 It wasn't like we had achieved perfection, but let's put it... You just can't. Um, you've raised fundamental doubts about American reliability and predictability. 10:45 You've raised fundamental doubts about exactly who we are. You've done a lot of damage, so after three more years, by the way, which could, one assumes, add to the damage, hard to imagine that we've bottomed out. 11:00 Uh, the idea that you're gonna basically say, "Well, never mind, and let's just put that aside. That was then, now is now," life doesn't work that way. Um, world moves on, people's thinking moves on. 11:12 There's knock-on effects. So this is, um... Now it's not, I'm not saying you can't dial some things back and you can't make some adjustments, but the idea that there's a, a return to the status quo ante, zero chance. 11:25 Zero chance. World's moved on. Co- countries now s- f- friends and foes alike see us differently. 11:32 Uh, so there'll still be choices to be made, but restoration, if you will, uh, a return to what was, that's not in its pure form, not even close. 11:44 How long does that take to return, if there even is a commitment to it, in your mind? Well, again, I don't think there is a return. Right. My point is simply that you're not gonna put Humpty Dumpty back together again. 11:53 Now are there things you could do that would be constructive? Absolutely. Are there things you could do to try to resurrect elements but that you thought were desirable about the old order? Absolutely, but 12:08 there's no going back. There's no return, and I think we, we ought not to kid ourselves. This will have... Look, you, you may love Donald Trump, you may hate Donald Trump, but I would... 12:16 he's gonna be on the shortlist of the most consequential presidents 12:20 of the United States, and he will even more internationally than domestically, 'cause domestically, maybe a little bit optimistic here-There's more pushback because of civil society and the structure of our political system, the structure of our society and so forth. 12:36 Uh, there's less structural pushback in a good way. There's pushback in a bad way from the Chinas and Russias and North Koreas and others. 12:46 Uh, but, um, I think his, his consequences internationally will be greater than his consequences, uh, domestically, and, uh, so he's ended an era. You know, we've basically had an 80-year, eight-decade run. That's over. 13:01 That is over. 13:02 But now, what I'm not smart enough, maybe you should get somebody else on your podcast, I'm not smart enough to tell you exactly what's gonna take its place, and I don't think we know the answer to that, and that gets into your question a little bit. 13:12 There's a range of possibilities. It's not, it's not only one future that could, uh... But the, but the choices are, are limited because what will be the inheritance? 13:24 Yeah, I heard on, uh, some, uh, podcast recently just about this, how, uh, Donald Trump's always been more concerned with his standing in the international kind of world than he has domestically, even going back, I heard someone say 40 years ago, in talking about his relationship with Gorbachev or- I'm not sure I agree with that. 13:41 I mean, I've spoken with him about foreign policy. He's got some strongly held views. Sees allies as free- freeloaders, hates trade, and all that. But I, I... 13:53 tends to be pretty isolationist, though now in the last year he's gotten a little bit more unilateralist. I think he's kinda gotten, um, excited about what limited, focused amounts of military force can accomplish. 14:07 But I, uh, uh, I never thought his big interests were international and still don't. Uh, you know, it's, you know, it's usually for presidents, it's less difficult to make a difference internationally. 14:19 Under the Constitution in our political system, presidents enjoy a freer hand. The role of Congress and the courts is negligible in foreign policy, or modest. 14:28 Uh, domestically they've at least potentially got a much bigger role. But I still think when you look at the Trump administration in terms of, you know, his policies, I think immigration, 14:38 uh, his change on the border is a significant, uh, change in, I would say, on balance an accomplishment. Uh, some other changes culturally in the country, uh, are s- significant. 14:51 So I'm not sure, y- y- I'm not sure if, if I would put things f- international at the forefront, though I g- I agree in recent weeks in particular, uh, I think he's been excited by what happened in Venezuela. 15:04 Uh, to so- some extent excited what happened months ago when he attacked the three Iranian installations. So I think he's a little bit caught up in the commander-in-chief role and what he can, uh, accomplish. 15:17 But so far, if you think about it, he's also avoided anything that's enduring in terms of... or costly. Mm. So, the trade-off he's made, yeah, he can act in dramatic ways, but in very limited ways. 15:28 He didn't act in Iran ultimately, at least so far. What we did in Venezuela was leadership change in a very narrow way, not regime change. Uh, the, the jury's out on what his policy is towards China. 15:43 Uh, we'll see what happens with, uh, Ukraine, we'll see what's, uh, happens with Greenland. 15:47 So I, uh, I don't see massive investments in foreign policy so much as, uh, momentary or circumscribed, uh, interventions in a very, in, in, in the general sense of the word. Yeah. 16:02 I think, uh, you know, he always seems to amaze me in, uh, saying kind of the quiet part out loud, the fact that he, you know, has now publicly, you know, indicated that not getting the Nobel Peace Prize is part of the reason that he's making a push for Greenland is, um, I still think it's... 16:16 I, I, maybe I apol- maybe it's like I did read the wrong thing and it was actually like a Saturday Night Live tweet and not a Donald Trump conversation. 16:23 Um, but- Yeah, but it's pretty worrisome and, you know, it wasn't just that the Nobel Prize is done by a committee, not the government, and it wasn't just that it was done by the Norwegian, it's Norwegian [laughs] rather than Danish, so they have nothing directly to do with Greenland. 16:38 But the, the equation, if you will, of his own aims or desires or needs, choose what you word you want, and the countries is quite stunning. 16:51 And it really was a kind of l'etat, l'etat, c'est moi moment, I thought, for the, uh, for this, uh, country. And qui- and quite as a result, disquieting. I'll be diplomatic, but quite disquieting. Yeah. 17:05 Um, I, I'm not gonna try and fact-check Donald Trump ever, uh, 'cause most of it's, uh, not true. Um, he likes to use this term how he's, uh, solved, I think he's negotiated eight and a half wars. 17:18 W- uh, but one thing I'm curious about in relationship to that is it, it feels like we've never had as many international conflicts going on at the same time. 17:29 Um, uh, you know, you, you've been around doing this a little bit longer, and maybe I'm just naive in that sense, but it feels like every day there's a new skirmish and a new, a new war somewhere. 17:38 Maybe it's just we see more of it on social media, but what's, what do you, what do, how do you feel when you look at the international world? Obviously, there's some horrific- Yeah. Yeah. 17:46 I think you're onto something with a slight caveat. But look, during the Cold War, the four decades of the Cold War, there were fewer conflicts. 17:55 There were conflicts, but there were fewer because it was a highly structured, highly regulated system, and there were certain largely informal rules of the road, arrangements, understandings between the superpowers. 18:10 They each policed an awful lot in their own respective blocks, particularly the Soviets and Eastern Europe, and with the Soviet Union itself was an empire. 18:20 And in other parts of the world, as I said, there were certain understandings, let's just use that word, about how competition was to play out, so it limited the scope, 18:29 the number and scope of conflicts, in part 'cause they were worried-That if there were too many, what they might lead to. You know, with the end of the Cold War, I think we've seen an uptick. 18:40 I, I think I'm right, I haven't looked at the data a- any time recently. But essentially we've become a, a less tightly knit world. 18:47 The fact that, you know, one of the first events of the post-Cold War era was Saddam Hussein's, uh, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was to me telling. 18:56 It's the kind of thing the Soviets never would've let take place during the Cold War. So it became a looser international system, and I think that's true. Then had the breakdown of the Soviet Empire, 19:10 both the internal empire as well as Eastern Europe, which led to conflicts in the former Soviet space. You've had the proliferation of various capacity, which has added to things. You also have a lot of state weakness. 19:25 So, you know, a lot of countries, the problem is not that they're strong, but that they're weak, and they can't police what goes on in their territory. You know, the... or they, they won't or can't. 19:35 And then I think in recent years what you have also is, uh, the United States pulling back. Particular- you know, u- under Obama, elements of it happened, under Trump one, 19:44 uh, to some extent Biden pulling out, you know, implementing the Trump deal on, uh, Afghanistan, and now Trump two. 19:51 So yeah, I think all things being equal, we are living in a, a messier world where there's more capacity and more scope almost for, uh, for, for mayhem. And I think that's, uh, that's happening. 20:06 It's a, it's a less controlled, it's a less top-down world. Uh, and sometimes some, some interesting things happen. It's not all bad. I mean, I think what the Israelis accomplished against, uh, 20:17 Hezbollah to some extent, uh, you know, what happened in Syria, what happened against Iran, some of these things were pretty benign. On the other hand, what, you know, Hamas accomplished, uh, 20:29 October, two-plus years ago was obviously as malign as things, uh... Yeah, so we're seeing a lot of dynamics. But, uh, I think your point, I think your insight's a good one. 20:39 I think we're seeing a world that is less controlled from the top down. Uh, and it's a co- it's a function of scope for action and increasing access to, uh, to capacity. 20:52 Uh, so, um- For one second, which is not to say that the President is right when he talks about all these, uh, thing, so-called wars he's ended. 21:00 I mean, let's take two of the most prominent, Israel-Palestinians or Israel-Ga- uh, Israel-Hamas and Gaza. That's continuing. The Palestinian conflict 21:09 is as alive, unfortunately, as it ever was and, and the Gaza ceasefire is not total. And to use words like peace, there's an enormous gap between the word ceasefire and peace. 21:21 And whatever else, yeah, you don't even have a, a fully-fledged ceasefire. You certainly don't have peace in Gaza. Um, they haven't even attempted the process just of disarming, um, Hamas. Or take India-Pakistan. 21:34 I mean, I was involved when I was in government in trying to diffuse Indo-Pakistani border conflicts and every decade or so, 21:42 usually there's exchanges, and there was one recently, and it was good the United States got on the horn and talked to people. But the idea that we've brought peace to India-Pakistan is preposterous. 21:53 Kashmir is still, uh, unsettled. There's fundamental frictions between the, uh, two. 22:00 India continues to charge at times with more than little evidence that Pakistan is carrying out, uh, terrorist actions in its territory. The, uh, the... 22:09 you know, these are two nuclear-armed countries, uh, which are, have each others in their sights. So to say that this is somehow, this is, you put this in the check, this is in the peace column is, is preposterous. 22:21 So I mean, the President... Uh, which is not to say that American diplomacy hasn't done good or can't do good. And when, when Marco Rubio or whatever, whoever gets on the phone and calms people down, good. That's what... 22:33 last I checked, that's why God invented diplomats. That's what the State Department is meant to, uh, to do. And the President just has a penchant for claiming, 22:42 uh, considerably more than he or his administration has accomplished. 22:46 Uh, we're gonna try and get to, uh, uh, as many of the conflicts as we can, and, and unfortunately just in a very superficial way 'cause we need an entire weekend with you to really dig deep. 22:55 Um, I would like to start in- I do superficial really well though, so [laughs] By the way, I- you are amazing at being able to help the people like myself who aren't, uh, that knowledgeable on all the different, uh, conflicts in different parts of the world and, and, and dispel, uh... 23:11 a- and just, and make it, uh, understandable and to the, to the layman. Right. So thank you. That's kind of second. Um, let, let's start in Iran 'cause I think that's top of mind for people. 23:21 Um, I, you know, what, what, what's the sort of lay of the land there right now? And what do you, what do you... 23:28 what's a realistic, uh, trying to understand the Trump administration as much as possible, which is obviously next to impossible. What, what do you see the kinda next steps happening and, and what time period? 23:40 Okay, so, you know, we're in, we're land of speculation here, but let's just paint the, the setting, the context. 23:46 You know, we're close to f- 50 years since the Iranian revolution that ousted the authoritarian regime of the Shah in 1979 and brought in the, uh, the clerics who, who took over in '79. 24:03 For me it was interesting 'cause I'd just been to Iran a year before doing some research, and then, uh, I was at the Pentagon at the time. Uh, so I got very involved in all this 'cause it led, among other things, 24:17 to what became all of our Middle Eastern forces, Central Command and all that. So I was involved, shall we say, from 1979 on. 24:26 I'd done my thesis on, my doctoral thesis on this part of the world, um, what the British called East of Suez, so this has been interesting to me for a long time. 24:34 I think what's happened in the last few months in IranIs the Iranian economy has really plummeted. The, uh, currency has lost an enormous amount of value. It's basically wallpaper. Uh, inflation has really spiked. 24:52 Uh, and there's water shortages, there's electricity shortages. So it's... 24:59 And to some extent, I would say it's hard to apportion numbers, but I'd say to a large extent by economic mismanagement and also an allocation of resources that made no sense. 25:12 To- Way too much of Iran's resources went into supporting proxies and nuclear weapons development rather than economics. Iran did things that then made them the target of all sorts of sanctions 25:24 which, which, uh, which, which further hurt, hurt, hurt them. So it's all coming together. Plus the regime is kind of, it's really sclerotic. It's... 25:35 I think for two-thirds of the Iranian people, plus or minus, this is just, it's a dead end. It, it, it isolates the Iranian people. You know, it's over 90 million Iranian people, a lot of very educated, very worldly. 25:49 It's an impressive society in many ways. This has just become boring. It's like it's the worst aspect of the old sclerotic communist regimes. 25:59 I think people feel it's just repressive in every way, and it's shut Iran off from so much of the interesting stuff they see on the internet or they see when they travel. So they-- I think people are just tired of it. 26:11 This revolution is ki- in many ways... And it's become really cynical. There's way too much, "Okay, well, we're oppressed women, but when our daughters go here they can do what they want." 26:21 Uh, the Iranian people have to do without, "Well, we're gonna make sure we get the consumer goods we want from this or that neighboring country." So I think there's real alienation and what... It just came together. Uh, 26:34 and you had, you know, in late December, you know, protests. Things got really bad economically. Uh, and then what's happened then is the regime responded with a little bit of token reform, but that was nonsense. 26:47 Essentially they re- they responded with brute brutality. I don't know how many thousands of people were killed, whether it's 3,000 or 13,000 or somewhere in between. 26:56 They shut the country off from global internet connectivity and so forth. The United States talked a good game. 27:05 The president said some things and posted some things, you know, we're locked and loaded, encouraging people to come out, which I thought was irresponsible. There was no way 27:14 we could use military force to protect individual Iranians from the people mowing them down. It wasn't clear to me that the moment had come to urge people to confront the regime. 27:27 I w- I, I was far c- convinced that the moment was ripe for regime change. Uh, the security forces were still intact and the opposition's deeply fragmented and weak. 27:41 So it wasn't obvious to me why, why we thought this was the moment. I'd be like... 27:45 Don't get me wrong, I'd love to see regime change in Iran with the g- one caveat or proviso that I can imagine different ways regime change could play out and it doesn't necessarily mean that people are gonna be reading, as I like to say, the Federalist Papers in Farsi. 28:00 I can imagine successor arrangements that would be very different and not necessarily benign, but let's put that, uh... So I just didn't think it was ready. So what... 28:10 So rather than trying to bring things to a head and encourage people to come out in the streets, we might have said, "Wow, this place is pretty weak." And what I wrote the other day 28:19 is the regime has never been closer to collapse at any time since 1979, but it's still not on the verge of collapse. And those two thoughts, I believe, can be true. 28:32 So a different policy would have said, this is really interesting. How do we move it closer to collapse? So rather than getting people out in the streets to get mowed down, 28:42 what could we do to ratchet up sanctions or build political opposition to the regime or strengthen the unity and effectiveness of the opposition and so forth? That to me would have been a better policy. 28:56 Uh, and basically play a little bit more disciplined game. We got undisciplined. We were, uh... 29:02 I think a- I think part of it, I can't prove this so it's dangerous to say but I'll say it anyhow, uh, I think after Venezuela the president was feeling his oats and thinking that all he had to do was say s- or threaten certain things and that he was, uh, the equivalent in the world of finance we say a master of the universe and he could 29:22 force things to fit his preferences, and I just think that we, we mishandled the situation. Seems to me the regime in the short run has reestablished or- order. 29:34 I think the opposition realized that taking them on in the streets and getting shot was a, just a losing gambit. But the regime has done nothing to correct the fundamental problems that face it. 29:46 So this, this story isn't over. I'm not smart enough to sit here and tell you, to use a baseball analogy, not to be silly, but to say I don't know if we're in the second inning or the seventh inning or what. 29:57 I don't know how far a- but this game ain't over. This regime, this system is still brittle and vulnerable. 30:05 And I, what I'm hoping, and I wrote a piece for the Financial Times the other day, I'm hoping we take a breath, take a step back and say, "Okay, we may have mishandled this. We can argue that." 30:15 But in any case, how do we start handling this right? 30:18 How do we play a s- a more disciplined game where over the next few months or years we can use our leverage to get Iran to stop doing things in the nuclear area with proxies as well as repressing its own people? 30:32 How can we, how can we use our leverage? And that ought to be the policy conversation we're having. Yeah. 30:37 I mean, unfortunately it seems like, um, par for the course for this administration is just sort of go in, uh, use some muscle without much brain power to back it up and to think about the afterthought, and it's sort of like a bull in a china shop type mentality. 30:52 Um, and- Well, but we didn't use any muscle. And-You know, possi- to some extent we may have in the economic sanctions era. And so, but again, you know, we, we... our rhetoric got way out in front. 31:06 It wasn't clear to me even if we had... Just imagine for a second we had used military force. We didn't, 'cause we didn't have many assets in the area. 31:13 They're either off Venezuela, which is one of the consequences of a big re-emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, somewhere in Asia. But just say we had attacked some Revolutionary Guard sites or s- whatever. 31:25 It wasn't axiomatic to me. We'll never know whether that would have triggered regime collapse. Maybe, not obvious, uh, to me. And just say a little bit of force didn't work. Well, then what? Do you then double down? 31:39 One of the problems in using military force, something Colin Powell once taught me. He once, he, he and I were having a conversation where President Bush, the father, this is when Powell was, uh, chairman. 31:52 And he said, "Never assign to me regime change as a mission, 'cause it's not a military mission. You can assign to me the task of destroying this site or this equipment or whatever. Uh, that's a military mission. 32:07 But regime change is what you hope to accomplish if you use military force, but there's no way of knowing if you were to use military force that way, that would be the result." 32:17 Again, I know if you tell me to use military force against this building, I can blow up the building. That's, that's something that is clear. But regime change, so don't, don't ever give me that mission. 32:28 'Cause also it leaves the initiative with the other si- uh, side. Let me put on my academic hat for a second. Whenever you use military force in a coercive way, 32:39 bizarrely enough, you have the, you leave yourself the discretion of how much force to use against what, but you leave all the discretion with the other side to decide whether they've had enough. 32:52 And what they, do they say, "I'll go," or do they retaliate, or do they simply sit it out and absorb it? 32:57 So the danger in using military force coercively is you cede the initiative, and many, bizarrely enough, to the side you're targeting. 33:06 So if your goal is regime change and you use military force, and 10 pounds of military force don't work, do you then do another 10 pounds? And then what? 33:16 So it's, it turns out to be a really complicated, uh, thing, and I don't, I don't get the sense anybody began to think that through. 33:24 Yeah, I mean, that's sort of what I mean more in sense is, is, is just thinking the whole thing through, um, and playing out scenarios. 33:30 You wrote in Foreign Affairs journal that, uh, direct attempts at regime change by United States have ended in disaster, and for good reason. 33:38 What lessons do you think we've learned or, uh, should be most relevant when you look at Iran and then also, you know, looking into Venezuela as well? 33:46 Well, just for those who didn't read the piece in Foreign Affairs about a week ago, look, there's regime change tends to come about for one of two reasons. 33:54 One is the one you were getting, which was the United States adopts a policy of trying to trigger it, and you, you know, often with military force. And but it's not always a disaster. It worked very well 34:06 in Germany and Japan after World War II. 34:09 We defeated them, we occupied them, and we midwifed new political systems, phenomenally successful, one of the greatest accomplishments or two of the greatest accomplishments in the history of American foreign policy. 34:22 Uh, we got rid of Noriega in Panama in, uh, in '89. More recent efforts of regime change have been disastrous. Afghanistan, Iraq 2003, and so forth. The other way regime change happens is collapse from within. 34:37 Iran in '79 is an example. Soviet Union under Gorbachev, uh, an, an, an example. Uh, and there the challenge is when the old collapses to see that the new is better. 34:51 Obviously in Iran it was worse, and after a temporary period in the former Soviet Union and Russia it got worse. Uh, so it's not a panacea, uh, uh, as, uh... Well, whatever else Venezuela was, it wasn't regime change. 35:04 It had nothing to do with regime change. Ven- if you... Venezuela was the rejection of regime change. 35:10 It's almost as if they read the textbook on Iro- on Iraq in 2003 and after and said, "We're gonna do everything 180 degrees different." So all they did was they got rid of one guy. 35:21 Got rid of Maduro, replaced him with his vice president, uh, Delcy Rodriguez. Otherwise, it looks pretty much... 35:27 Venezuela today looks like Venezuela yesterday, and the only difference is we've established a transactional relationship where we hope to get O- American oil companies involved, and I think that's gonna be dramatically exaggerated, the degree to which they're gonna get involved and how much oil they're gonna, uh, 35:43 produce given the cost and given all the uncertainties associated with, uh, Venezuela, and we basically threw the opposition pretty much to the, to the curb. Uh, so that's, that's, that, if you will... 35:57 And that's consistent with what we, you and I were talking about a couple of minutes ago. This is an administration that doesn't want expensive foreign policy. 36:03 A policy of regime change in Venezuela, very hard to do regime change offshore. We would probably have to have a pretty big presence. That would get ugly and messy, and this administration has no appetite for that. 36:16 Iran, again, it's not clear to me it's ripe for regime change or again that you can do it offshore. Uh, what, you, you think if you lob some cruise missiles or whatever? Maybe, but not likely. And again, 36:28 what I think Libya shows, it's one thing to get rid of the, an awful regime like Gaddafi's, but bad things can get worse or as bad in a different way. 36:38 So when the Obama administration got rid of Gaddafi and there was no follow-up, so Libya turns into a failed state. Why is that a, why is that a foreign policy succe- success? Answer is it's not. It was a fiasco. 36:51 And so, yeah, I think we ought to... 36:54 Regime change that we foment from the outside ought to be done very rarely and then very carefully.I think, you know, what's interesting now, if we play Iran like we can contribute to it a little bit, but 37:07 hopefully encourage collapse, Cuba, it'd be interesting to see how that might play out. So there may be some opportunities to work with situations. 37:17 Uh, but, but the idea that we're gonna run around the world fomenting regime change strikes me, uh, almost always a pretty bad idea. 37:25 Before we get to Greenland and Gaza and Israel, I wanna stop to talk a little bit about the bill of obligations in your book, uh, which could be its own hour, and everybody should read this. 37:35 Uh, and you mentioned something about kind of regimes kind of imploding from within. Uh, and I think we've lost our way a bit in our country and sort of the role and the responsibility of our citizens. 37:46 And I think people who listen to this conversation and, uh, they've, um, they've shown that they care and that they're interested and they're curious, um, and I think, um, but we can all be doing a little more. 37:57 But will you, you know, give a little bit of a summary, uh, before everybody goes and reads the book for those who haven't? Sure. Thank you. Thanks for raising it. Yeah, it's a departure for me. 38:08 I mean, as you hopefully have sensed in the last half hour, so I, I am a kind of a foreign policy guy. And the reason I, I wr- I wrote a book about dealing with citizenship and democracy 38:19 is, at least until recently, I thought the greatest challenge to our national security was stuff that was happening within the erosion, weakening of the fabric of American, uh, democracy. 38:32 But I also concluded that a lot of the very good ideas that were circulating a- about w- what you might call structural improvements weren't gonna happen. 38:41 Almost any good idea you put out there will be resisted 'cause not everyone will agree it's a good idea 'cause it will work against what they see as, uh, their, their, their agenda. 38:53 So I basically said we had to rethink, uh, our politics a bit in order to promote desirable behavioral change, but not what stru- uh, but not by changing the electoral college or making every primary open, it's not... 39:09 or, or what have you. It's not that these things would be bad. Indeed, they could be good, but I just didn't think you could bring about, bring them about. 39:17 So what I wanted to do was focus on things for the most part where people had more agency, behavioral kinds of things, like to get be- informed, get involved, 39:26 to think about citizenship, not simply through the lens of rights, but also the, the lens of obligations, the other side of the, uh, coin, obligations you... the two of us to one another, 39:38 obligations each of us to the country and the, uh, government. 39:42 Most of these things were behavioral or normative, uh, you know, get involved, get informed, reject political, uh, violence, put the country before a party or a person, 39:56 have some responsibility obligations to your fellow citizens and so forth. Two of them were a little bit different. Uh, one was to promote civics education. 40:07 And just as an aside, now I'm in the final stages of provi- uh, pr- producing a syllabus, which I'll make publicly available for high schools and colleges to teach, uh, civics, 40:17 uh, my, my sense of what they ought to, what they ought to be, uh, teaching, and then to also to promote public service. 40:25 Uh, uh, something that I real- I think public service is good not only 'cause it creates bonds between people and the government, but also 40:32 I'm worried that increasingly we don't know one another, that we, we have different economic backgrounds and educational and religious and this and that and geographic, and we're increasingly siloed in this country. 40:46 And, you know, when you read Tom Brokaw about the Greatest Generation and the draft, though I'm not, I'm not arguing to bring back the draft, but one of the good things of the draft 40:55 was that it brought Americans together who would normally never interact or meet, and it gave them some common experience, and it broke back... 41:02 it broke down certain stereotypes and prejudices, and I worry that we're, we're, we're losing that. So again, most of the book, again, is a, a book at arguing for how we... 41:12 to rethink citizenship and civility and compromise and a lot of things that we can, we can try to encourage. Parents can, teachers can, religious leaders can, and so forth. Uh, and then again, 41:27 two things, you know, civics and, uh, and, uh, public service can be fostered by the, by the, by the state. And what I wanted to do was really have more of a, 41:38 have something of a conversation in this country about citizenship, 'cause I think, Jamie, a lot of us would probably admit that something's gone wrong, something's out of... it's just kind of, it's on tilt, and 41:52 we've got to fix it. And what I wanted to do was, now I don't claim to have all the answers, God knows, but I wanted to put something out there and say, "We have got to have this conversation." 42:02 And what's nice is, uh, it's, it's had some resonance. I've been lucky, um, PBS made a documentary based on it. 42:09 Now what's very cool, someone came to me, and there's a whole concert, orchestral and choral, it's gonna be performed in all 50 states in the course of this year, and half of the libretto is based on my book. 42:22 For one, one piece is based on a half-hour choral orchestra, another's based on, um, Langston Hughes's poem about America. 42:28 And the whole idea is to use music to bring the ideas of citizenship, uh, to a much larger slice of, uh, Americans. I guess I mentioned my syllabus. So I'm trying to think of different ways 42:40 that I can foster something of a conversation, uh, in the country about citizenship and about, and about democracy, about why it's valuable, but also what it takes to keep democracy, uh, vibrant. 42:53 Yeah, I think that's, uh, so critical. And honestly, I think na- s- national service is probably the most important thing that we could all be doing. 43:00 I mean, what Wes Moore is doing in Maryland is great, but I think it has to be, uh, you know, something across the country and to get back to a way of people communicating. 43:09 And I think if you see other regimes falling, there was this, you know, great movie on Netflix called Leave the World Behind, which I really thought was... did an amazing job of... 43:19 kind of highlighting i- these issues that, uh, you know, if you, the, the sort of the enemy within is really the sort of the most dangerous thing and, and, uh- You're much more serious than me. 43:28 I'm busy watching Suits [laughs] on Netflix and you're watching Leave the World [laughs] Maybe I should reverse Yeah, there you go. Um, so, um, yeah, let's talk about Greenland for a minute. Um, I, I mean, is there... 43:43 I mean, you keep hearing the same thing over and again, that right, this makes no sense for, you know, we could have had anything we wanted if we walked into Greenland and said, "Give us bases, give us rare earths, give us..." 43:52 They'd pay... Woulda, woulda said yes. I mean, for Trump it's a real estate deal. I mean, it could just be this Nobel Peace Prize thing. Although he did bring it up previously, my understanding. 44:02 What, what ha- what happens in Greenland here? I mean, a- again, I know you can't tell the future, um, but I, I, I mean, we can't take over Greenland. I mean, it's- Like it... But, but you're... 44:13 To circle back to what you just said, which is the basic point, we do have legitimate interests in Greenland. Let's just posit that. We have strategic interests. 44:25 The irony is the strategic interests have grown because of that phrase which is no longer uttered by this administration called climate change. 44:32 But the waterways have opened up, so Greenland is more strategically important than it was. Russia and China have built up certain capacities to act, so it's a legitimate set of concerns. 44:44 I don't know, you know, it's hard to get a clear bottom line on things like rare earths, but it's, but it's plausible that Greenland might be s- economically s- and strategically important as well. 44:56 And as you say, if Marco Rubio had taken a day and flown over there, it's what, four-hour flight, five-hour flight? Popped up in Nuuk, 45:05 if I'm pronouncing it right, and sat down and said, "Hey, we'd like to have a closer relationship with you. We wanna do it in the way that you're comfortable with. 45:13 We want you to participate, particularly in the economic development of the place," yada, yada, yada. My guess is they would've said, "Fantastic, where do we sign?" 45:24 This is as unnecessary, as avoidable, as self-generated a crisis as I think I've ever experienced. I can be hard-pressed. I, I might, might, might be overlooking something, but this is, um, this wasn't on my bingo card. 45:39 Let me just say that, and it never should've been on anybody's bingo, uh, card. How does it play out? With one caveat, it's not too late to deal with it. 45:50 I mean, uh, what I'm hoping is the Europeans come forward with a pretty forthcoming proposal for how to do what you and I have just been talking about, how to have a more intimate strategic and a economic relationship there, short of transferring ownership and dealing with the kinda symbolic issues. 46:11 Uh, it's gotta be done consensually, not coercively. Uh, I think it's really interesting whether at some point the Europeans call Trump's bluff and put troops on the island, 46:24 and basically say, "You wanna, you wanna take it, then come take it, but we're gonna defend it." I'm not s- I'm not sure that, uh, he would be willing to follow through on that. 46:35 I'm not sure I wanna find out either way and, you know, what he might do. And it just seems to me that could be lose-lose. That's why, again, 46:42 I like the idea of the Europeans coming forward with a, a very constructive proposal, almost like they did on Ukraine when they didn't like the 28-point plan. 46:51 And then it makes it harder for Trump publicly to say, "Well, we, we gotta have ownership." 46:55 When the answer is there's nothing in history that says you need to own something in order to work constructively with it militarily. 47:02 I mean, last I checked, you know, you know, we didn't own Europe, and we somehow made NATO work for 40 years of Cold War. We don't own Taiwan. I go around the world. So I find our position just... 47:15 It just never occurred to me. I gotta tell you, it wasn't, it just wa- it just wasn't something I imagined being an issue. Here we are. So the question is whether you can defuse it, hopefully. 47:27 I, I think the odds are still decent. That said, we shouldn't c- gets back to something you were saying before, but we don't return to the status quo ante even if we defuse it. We've done real damage here, 47:37 and it's reinforced the sense that this is a very different United States that is on a very different political-cultural page than Europe. And for Europeans, this just reinforces the, 47:50 what, the, the shock to the body politic. And so hopefully we can avoid a crisis, if you will, or worsening crisis over Greenland, but we can't... Let's not kid ourselves, it's done real damage. 48:03 His answer in his press conference today when, uh, was, uh, when someone asked, "What's gonna happen in Greenland?" He said, "You'll find out." Um, so, um- It's hard to know what's, what... 48:13 It's hard to know what's- Yeah. Um- If he does that, it would be, it would epitomize the phrase pyrrhic victory. It would be an extraordinarily cost... It's already been extraordinarily costly. 48:27 It would just double or triple down on the, on the costs rather than the, uh, benefits. And, you know, and look, presidents en- enjoy tremendous latitude when it comes to foreign policy. 48:38 He's not the first or the last who does. Uh, be re- be an int- another, though I, I, I'm not confident in the answer, a test about whether he continues to enjoy a blank check from Republicans in the Senate. 48:51 Would they allocate funds for a Greenland policy of con- of conquest? Be an interesting test case whether there's any limits to Republican support in the Congress for this president. I don't wanna find out about that. 49:06 Um, let's move to, uh, the board of peace, um, which is gonna be headed by Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orbán. Um, uh, can he [laughs]... You know, I, 49:19 it's hard to even comprehend what this is or what it could be or what the idea is. Um, you indicated earlier, um, the situation in Gaza and Israel is, is not in a good place today. 49:31 Um, what, what uh, you take away from this board of peace? What do you think is kind of happening moving forward?Again, yeah, I used to think I had a pretty good imagination. I kind of prided myself on that. 49:46 Man, I'm, I'm a piker. I wasn't even close. Um, yeah, the Board of Peace is... I mean, if George Orwell could have joined us today, he would've liked it. Uh, aptly named. Look, I'm not a big fan of the UN. 50:01 My, uh, enthusiasm for the UN, shall we say, is distinctly finite. And I... And for decades I've been writing about coalitions of the willing. 50:09 So I'm, I'm all in favor of ad hoc arrangements of entities, countries, and others that are like-minded, 50:17 have relevant capacities, willing to use them to deal with particular challenges, and we've, we've used that over the years pretty well. This is 50:28 a little bit like that, except it seems to in- it seems to wanna institutionalize it. It goes beyond Gaza. It's not like Gaza's been a, a raging success, by the way. And then the, the membership is 50:42 passing strange, would be a diplomatic, uh, understatement. The idea that countries have to pay up to do it seems to me has it exactly backwards. 50:51 If you were gonna create a capacity to promote peace, you should pay those whose only interest was promoting peace. 50:57 This suggests to me that if countries have to pay to join it, they have, shall we say, alternative agendas of self-interest rather than simply, uh, peace. So I think this is a terrible idea, let me just say. 51:09 I hope it dies of its own weight. That's probably the best thing that could happen to it. But it seems to me... And again, 51:16 don't get me wrong, I'm not against ad hoc forms of multilateralism, because formal standing multilateralism, like the UN, is increasingly irrelevant. So I think you need to tailor, uh, responses to specific challenges. 51:34 Uh, again, coalitions of the willing, whatever you wanna call them, various kinds of... But this sa- this institutionalization, given this membership, given these terms, seems to me truly misguided. 51:45 Do, do you have any optimism in, uh, Gaza and Israel today? Obviously, elections are gonna be next year. That's the big, you know, sort of- Ele- elections in Israel before this October. Oh, this October. Okay. Sorry. 51:57 Yeah. So yeah, it's already 2026, unless my dates are wrong. But I think- No, you're right... uh, the, um... Uh, and I'm not smart enough to know how those will play. 52:09 I don't rule out that Bibi Netanyahu will form a new government. I think there's a respectable chance he will. But it's hard to know. You, you've never had a majority government in Israel's history. 52:22 This would be, uh, some kind of an unwieldy coalition. There's lots of fault lines in Israeli society, dealing with the Orthodox, dealing with, you know, judges. 52:32 So I, I, I'm not smart enough to know how this is gonna play, but I don't think you've got much of a consensus in Israel to deal with the Palestinians, much more of a consensus to deal with Iran than the Palestinians. 52:44 Uh, by deal, I mean be tough with Iran. But I, I... There's no consensus there. I've been involved with, uh, what's called, you know, in, in... With disarming groups. I was the US envoy to Northern Ireland. 52:56 There, we called it decommissioning. The idea that you are gonna disarm Hamas and know you've done it, I think the odds of that are negligible. Negligible. Uh, so I'm not optimistic about, uh, Gaza. 53:09 I'm also very pessimistic... I'm very worried about what's going on in the West Bank. It doesn't get the attention, but settlement expansion, settler violence. 53:18 Uh, also you still don't have a Palestinian partner to work with. So you know, I once wrote a book about ripeness, R-I-P-E-N-E-S-S, and the whole argument was in negotiations, yeah, you needed 53:32 agreements, and yeah, you needed processes, but what you really needed more than anything was leadership on the various sides that was, one, willing, and two, able to cut a deal. 53:42 And in Israel and in the Palestinians, I don't see that. I just don't think the situation is ripe, 'cause you don't have circumstances where you have leadership that's willing and able to, to, to compromise. 53:53 And Hamas has zero incentive to compromise. It doesn't want a Jewish state. There's no Palestinian alternative to Hamas. The Israelis won't let one materialize. 54:02 The Israelis themselves aren't having come together to cut a deal, and a growing percentage of Israelis don't want to make, to accommodate Palestinian nationalism. So I, uh, 54:14 I'm sorry to be so pessimistic, and I think both Palestinians and Israelis are gonna lose from this. I hope I'm wrong, but at the moment, uh, I don't see much to work with. And the United States is acting passively. 54:27 If you... I- if I were involved, then I would say, "Hey, there's not a lot of work to work with, so if we're just passive or wait for it to emerge, we're gonna be waiting for Godot." 54:37 So I would say if we think this is a situation that time will not benefit by inattention, then I would basically be asking, how do we ch- how do we change the dynamics? How do we basically light a fire under diplomacy? 54:51 And I don't see the, I don't see us doing that. So I, uh, I think it's a difficult situation, extraordinarily difficult, being badly handled. 55:00 W- we only have a few minutes left, and I have a couple of, uh, important things to get through. So, uh- Yeah... we're gonna have to... [laughs] I, um- I apo- I don't mean to take- I don't... 55:07 No, I could talk to you for hours. 55:09 Um, uh, you know, I'm sort of shocked at sometimes of what takes, what sucks up the air in the news and the news cycles, and, uh, you know, and Steve Bannon's, um, f- flood the zone philosophy works really well. 55:21 But y- you see, you know, the idea that we're not talking about Ukraine, Russia every day on the front page, the fact that there's been 35,000 children at minimum that have been kidnapped, the fact that at the same time nobody seems to care that Trump's still, uh, including, you know, Putin in his Board of Peace, uh, you know, I don't... 55:39 I- I'm sort of, uh, bewildered. Um, I mean, it doesn't seem like there's any sort of road to an end there. I know Donald Trump was gonna solve that on day one. Um, but like- Well, let, let me interrupt. 55:51 There is a road to an end thereWhat we have to do is disabuse Putin of his confidence that time is on our side. So Trump wants peace. Good for him. 56:01 Uh, what he won't do is combine his goals with hi- his ends and his means. 56:08 If we wanna have peace, we've gotta be much more supportive of Ukraine, not that they're gonna li- militarily liberate Crimea, but they've gotta persuade Putin that more war will not give him more results. 56:19 We will not do that. We continue to leave Putin with the expectation or hope that our support for Ukraine is essentially a diminishing asset. 56:29 So the war's gonna continue, but if we wanted to end the war, we could end the war, I believe. We could get a ceasefire, which the president should have supported then. He was persuaded in Alaska to move away from. 56:40 And the way to do it is by being very supportive of Ukraine, again, not to liberate all its lands militarily, but to be strong enough so Putin understands that more war will not give him more results, give Ukraine the ability to inflict some greater costs on Russia. 56:56 That to me would set the stage for a ceasefire. I think it's... I actually think this is doable. The president is sabotaging his own policy. 57:04 Why he's doing it, that's the land of speculation about what explains his policy towards Putin and Russia. Uh, I defer to you. Well, let's hope he follows your advice at some point. Um, I'm gonna give you... 57:15 The final, uh, question on this test is gonna be something hopeful to leave with us with. 57:20 Um, but before we get there, um, I've heard you and others talk about a lot, uh, on, you know, what's going on in Minnesota with the ICE troops, with everything kind of going on is leading towards this push to how do we limit free, you know, elections in even 2026. 57:38 How real do you think that is and, um, how concerned are you? I am concerned. I wrote about it in my most recent Home and Away. Uh, I take it seriously. 57:54 Look, uh, I look at the use of ICE, which is by the way being used not as a police force, but as a paramilitary force, which is wildly inappropriate. President talks about invoking the Insurrection Act. 58:06 He's talked about it with quite a certain frequency, talks about deploying forces, expresses his regret that voting machines were not seized in 2020. I could go on and on. 58:16 I think one of the things we've learned in the last few years is not to assume things, that, "Oh, that couldn't happen." Well, you know what? It could happen. It could happen. 58:25 So I take it seriously, and one of the things I believe we need to do, and I'm think- I'm beginning to think it through, I'm not there yet, is, but the way I'd cast the challenge is how do we build resilience into American democracy this year? 58:38 How do we basically make ourselves less vulnerable to a real setback, either around the midterms or anything else? And the answer is not violence. 58:47 Uh, that's dumb, 'cause that would create the grounds for using more forces. But how is it we, uh, protect the process? 58:53 How do we get more people to go out and vote so it's harder to, uh, play around with the results of the elections? A third of eligible voters didn't vote in the presidential election a year ago. 59:07 How do we avoid that again? How do we get people to, to vote? How is it we prepare the legal challenges? How do we deal with mail-in voting? How do we make sure voting machines are not impounded and... 59:19 It's just, you know, there's a... 59:20 I'm not an expert on this, and I'm trying to get smarter on it, but we ought to basically be prepared for this in the same way I would say like a hospital deserves for, prepares for a, a mass violent incident or the military prepares for, for battle or a drug company prepares for a massive recall. 59:39 We as a democracy ought to prepare for a challenge to the, uh, conduct. 59:47 The run-up to the election day and then election day and the aftermath of election day, we ought to basically say, how do we build resilience into our, into our, our system? 59:57 Um, I know, well, there's great people like Marc Elias who are working out there daily to, to try and deal with the legal, uh, cases, who's been doing, you know, is like a superhero. 1:00:04 Um, at the same time, I get very scared when, you know, I think Trump's approval rating with Republicans is, you know, still around 80%, and, um, you know, although obviously it's, it's, you know, very low overall. 1:00:17 Um, all right, uh, last question to finish up on, um, give us something hopeful. Give us something that you, uh, do you see any light at the end of the tunnel? Do you see any places where there's some optimism? 1:00:32 Okay, so yeah, of course. One, I, I'll begin with my favorite part of life, which is sports. I mean, Indiana winning last night was an amazing thing, the greatest turnaround in college sports history. 1:00:44 It shows what great leadership can do. And, and I love that the whole was great. I actually thought Miami had a more athletic team, but Indiana had a better team, and I thought that was a great, uh, lesson. 1:00:58 The fact that John Harbaugh's gonna co- be the head coach of the Giants, we're gonna make the playoffs next year. I feel tremendous optimism, uh, about that. On public policy, uh, issues, 1:01:10 look, I think you're beginning to see some pushback. I like the way, I like what, um, Jay Powell did the other day with his video. Uh, I like that other people are, are pushing back. You know, Jack Smith or, or others. 1:01:25 I, I like... People aren't taking this lying down, the conversation we just had about resilience. I... There's lots in play here. 1:01:34 I think lots of people are disappointment, are disappointing or have been disappointments, I'm, I mean to say, but not, not, uh... I, I like what Mark Kelly's doing. 1:01:43 I like the way he's taking on the Secretary of War, as he, uh, likes to be, uh, uh, called. I'm excited about technology. You know, think about it. We got through COVID how? Two technologies, 1:01:56 mRNA vaccines and Zoom.That's how we survived COVID. Okay, you know, climate change, you know, these, these annual conferences are a joke. No, it's not a joke, technology. Uh, solar, wind, batteries. 1:02:12 I actually think we'll make real progress, uh, on dealing with climate through, through, uh, technology. AI has lots of upsides as well. 1:02:19 Yeah, it's gonna be job displacing, I get it, but a lot of things in medicine and other areas, AI's gonna be, uh, uh, I think quite, quite promising. So, you know, 1:02:32 in lots of cases we know what to do, we just have to do it. Um, you know, I look in New York City and I think that the problem with New York City is not re- we don't lack for revenues. 1:02:42 We lack for spending reve- the revenues we have intelligently. And the question is whether we can... You know, so I don't think the... It's like I... 1:02:49 Which is a way of saying, I don't feel the stuff we're talking about is impossible. I don't feel like we're Don Quixote til- tilting at windmills. So it's what gets me up every day, and the reason I don't give up. 1:03:02 Maybe I'm naive, but I continue to think there's, there's ways to deal, to deal with these, uh, challenges. So I'm not sanguine in the sense that, uh, well, because we've always done it, we always will. 1:03:13 I think that's a bit of a dangerous line. Just that we can. I actually think the potential is still there to, to get it right, and I think there's enough people 1:03:24 who are maybe seeing that they better get off their keisters and do something. I worry a little bit about too many people of authority and position and power and wealth in this country who are playing it safe. 1:03:35 And so to me, part of the challenge is to get them more, get them on the playing field. I, I don't know how you feel, but, uh, if things don't work out, I don't wanna go through the shoulda, coulda, woulda game. 1:03:46 I think this is a moment where everybody's gotta suit up and get on the field. 1:03:50 I think there are gonna be a lot of people looking back at what they were doing during this, this time in our lives, and, uh, I know, uh, what you've been doing, uh, you'll be proud of that and, and your family and children were. 1:04:02 Uh, everybody who's listening to this conversation I think will be proud of that. Uh, there are a lot of other people I'm concerned about. Um, I, um, would agree with you, Fernando Mendoza gives me hope. 1:04:11 The fact you were an offered a walk-on role at a, at a college, then you come back and beat them in the national championship game should give us all hope. I am, uh... 1:04:20 If I had it to bet on Polymarket or Kalshi what's more likely, the Giants, uh, making the Super Bowl in the, in the next five years or any of these, or any of these crisis being solved, I would vote on the crisis before I'd vote on the Giants. 1:04:33 So I- All right. Now I'm sorry I... Now I am sorry I did this. [laughs] You've hurt my, you've hurt my feelings. We're gonna have a bet on that, and you're gonna lose serious bucks. 1:04:42 Richard, just for your, for your wellness- First, the comment. You're gonna... That's gonna be a very expensive comment on your part, I'm just letting you know now... 1:04:48 for your wellness to think that Harbaugh's gonna come in and s- and, and be your sa- savior, I just, I'm, I'm concerned about you. I want... 1:04:55 And, and it's important that you are, we have you fighting for us every day, and having too much faith in the Giants is, is not gonna help. Um- The price keeps going up, my man. 1:05:05 I'm a Dolphin fan, I'm in a much worse situation, so don't worry about it. [laughs] You're right. 1:05:09 Uh, thank you very much, Richard, and I, uh, I listen to everything you say, and I, uh, read the Substack and read you in the FT, and please keep it up. I... 1:05:18 You, you are working, burning the candle on both ends, and so thank your family for us as well. All right. It's great to see everybody, and, uh, I'll speak to you soon. Thanks for doing this. Okay, thank you. Bye. 1:05:28 Take care. Bye. [upbeat music] Thanks for tuning in to this week's episode of Lunch with Jamie. 1:05:36 As always, be sure to subscribe to my newsletter at jamieslist.com for my thoughts on all things food, pop culture, politics, and more. 1:05:44 And remember, to join these online conversations and ask my guests questions in real time, sign up to become a paid subscriber. You can listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or Audible, and be sure to leave a review. 1:05:56 Thanks, and see you next time.